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The First Amendment:  Religious Freedom for 
All, Including Muslims 
Asma Uddin* 
I’m going to start by describing the various categories and types of 
anti-sharia laws that have been proposed in various states.  Then, I’m going 
to do a brief analysis of those laws under the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and show the types of issues 
and problems that raises, and then end with explaining how, ultimately, 
these laws solve a non-existent problem. In other words, there isn’t really a 
need for them, and when they are enacted, other issues pop up. 
The last panel discussed The Center for American Progress Report, 
“Fear, Inc.”1  This report describes the Islamophobia cottage industry in this 
country.2 The report starts by defining what is Islamophobia, which it says 
is an “exaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility toward Islam and Muslims that 
is perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination, and 
the marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from America’s political, 
social, and civic life.”3 It then goes on to discuss the five key individuals 
and organizations that are pushing this agenda.4  They are people and 
organizations whose names you, like most Americans, won’t be familiar 
with, but they are having a concrete influence on the national and 
international debate and discourse related to Islam and Muslims.5 
These guys, dubbed “misinformation experts” by the “Fear, Inc.” 
report, are advancing a notion of Islam as an intrinsically violent ideology, 
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 1. Wajahat Ali et al., Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America, 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 9 (Aug. 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/ 
pdf/islam ophobia.pdf. 
 2. See id. (discussing the organization and the key players in the Islamophobia 
industry). 
 3. Id. at 9. 
 4. See id. at 13 (listing the five leading think tanks pushing Islamophobia). 
 5. See id. (stating that these five organizations, “are primarily responsible for 
orchestrating the majority of anti-Islam messages polluting our national discourse today”). 
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the goal of which is to achieve dominance over America and over all non-
Muslims worldwide.6  And they seek to define sharia as a totalitarian 
ideology; a legal, political, military doctrine committed to annihilating 
Western civilization as we know it today.7 That’s pretty extreme rhetoric, 
but despite its inherent absurdity, it’s definitely having an effect, 
unfortunately.  And one of the effects that we see is the promulgation of 
these anti-Sharia laws.8 
There are three categories of anti-Sharia laws. The first category 
includes those that single out Sharia specifically from all other legal 
traditions and describe it as anti-American and treasonous. A prime 
example of this type of legislation is Alabama’s proposed, but now dead 
bill, which stated that a court shall not look to the legal precepts of other 
nations or cultures, specifically the court shall not consider international 
law or sharia.9 The second category mentions sharia specifically, but 
mentions it as one of several different types of legal traditions that should 
not be permitted.  For instance, the Arizona bill, says that courts are 
forbidden from considering religious sectarian law, which it goes on to 
define as including sharia law, canon law, halacha and karma.10 And finally, 
the third and most frequently seen type of bill is the type that outlaws any 
reliance by the courts on foreign law. It does not mention sharia 
specifically. These types of bills define foreign law as any law, rule, or 
legal code, or system other than the state and federal constitutions, state and 
federal statutes, and the ratified treaties of the U.S. 
In today’s presentation, I want to focus on one of these laws, and that 
is the Oklahoma International Law Amendment, which was on the 
November 2010 general election ballot as a legislatively referred 
                                                                                                     
 6. See, e.g., CTR. FOR SEC. POLICY, SHARIAH: THE THREAT TO AMERICA, AN EXERCISE 
IN COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS (REPORT OF TEAM ‘B’ II) 53 (2010), available at 
http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/upload/wysiwyg/article%20pdfs/Shariah%20-
%20The%20Threat%20to%20America%20(Team%20B%20Report)%2009142010.pdf 
(stating that Muslims use the “supremacist character of the Shariah” as an “instrument for 
realizing its global dominance”). 
 7. See id. at 10 (stating that Sharia Law should not be thought of as a religious code 
but a document which regulates economic, political, legal, social, and military actions). 
 8.  See infra notes 9–11. 
 9. H.R. 597, 2011 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011) (Constitutional Amendment), 
available at http://e-lobbyist.com/gaits/text/282975. 
 10. H.R. 2582, 15th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011), available at http://www. 
azleg.gov/legtext/50leg/1r/bills/hb2582p.pdf. 
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constitutional amendment.11 The ballot initiative was approved by 
Oklahoma voters and fell into the first category of anti-sharia law. So it 
specifically mentioned sharia and singled it out, for specific disfavor. That 
same month Muneer Awad, represented by the Council on American-
Islamic Relations, and the ACLU, filed suit challenging the law. 
The U.S. district court in Oklahoma blocked the measure, saying any 
sort of harm that would result from a delay in certifying the election results 
was minimal because the legislatures could not show even one instance in 
which sharia had in any way led to any problems.12 In other words, anti-
sharia laws are a solution looking for a problem.  In January 2012, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court13 and there was 
little activity on this in the 2012 Oklahoma legislature, but 2013 finds a new 
effort: House Bill 1486.14 HB 1486 does not specifically mention sharia and 
falls closer to the third type of anti-sharia law that I mentioned earlier.15 
For purposes of my analysis today, I’m going to be focusing on the 
earlier version of the bill—the one that did mention sharia. I’ll start by 
briefly setting up the constitutional framework. 
First, there’s the Establishment Clause, and the purpose of the 
Establishment Clause is to protect religion from state overreaching.16 And 
its protection extends to both minority and majority religions.17  
There are various legal tests used to assess whether or not a law 
violates the Establishment Clause. We are all familiar with the three-prongs 
of the Lemon18 Test; the idea is that the intent behind the law and the 
                                                                                                     
 11. H.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg Sess. (Okla. 2010); H.R. 4769, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Mich. 2011), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2011-2012/bill 
introduced  /House/pdf/2011-HIB-4769.pdf. 
 12. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla. 2010). 
 13. See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 14. H.B. 1486, 54th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2013), available at http://www.ok 
legislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=hb1486&Session=1300. 
 15. See Bill Raftery, Oklahoma’s effort to ban court use of international/sharia law 
having been held unconstitutional, new version introduced avoids using word “sharia,” 
GAVEL TO GAVEL (Jan. 23, 2013), available at http://gaveltogavel.us/site/2013/01/23/ 
oklahomas-effort-to-ban-court-use-of-internationalsharia-law-having-been-held-
unconstitutional-new-version-introduced-avoids-using-word-sharia/. 
 16. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971) (“[T]he Constitution’s authors 
sought to protect religious worship from the pervasive power of government.”). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. at 612. 
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primary effect of the law cannot disfavor or favor a particular religion, and 
cannot excessively entangle the government in religious questions.19 
Under the Free Exercise Clause, protection for religious beliefs is 
absolute.20 When it comes to religiously-motivated action, there is broad 
protection in certain cases, for instance, where the law in question has 
existing categorical exemptions or allows for a system of individualized 
exemptions.21 The idea generally under the Free Exercise Clause is that if 
there are exemptions for secular conduct or for particular religious conduct, 
you cannot then disfavor other religious conduct.22 If the law allows for 
these other exemptions, in order to prohibit a religious exemption, it must 
satisfy strict scrutiny—which means that the government must demonstrate 
a compelling interest and the law must be the least restrictive means of 
serving that interest.23 So thematically, the Free Exercise Clause requires 
that individuals be given wide discretion in ordering their lives according to 
their religious beliefs. 
Based in the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses is a doctrine 
called the religious question doctrine.24 Under the First Amendment, the 
government and religious individuals kind of exist in two separate 
“spheres,” and the First Amendment protects each from interference from 
the other.25 The First Amendment protects government from religious 
                                                                                                     
 19. See id. (“[T]he statute must have a secular legislative purpose . . . its primary 
effect must be one that neither advances or inhibits religious conduct . . . and finally that the 
statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.”). 
 20. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hiaheah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 
(1993) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to 
others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”). 
 21. See id. at 537 (“Further, because it requires an evaluation of the particular 
justification for the killing, this ordinance represents a system of “individualized 
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.” (quoting Employment 
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S., at 884, 110 S. Ct., at 1603)). 
 22. See Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 361 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise clause and thus 
beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability). 
 23. See id. (discussing the strict scrutiny test). 
 24. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 347 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1963) 
(explaining that both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause place our 
Government in a “neutral” position). 
 25. See Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (“For the 
First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to 
achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”). 
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incursion and religion from government incursion.26 One way this works is 
that civil courts cannot delve substantively into religious questions.27 Courts 
can engage in fact-finding, in order to determine whether a particular 
doctrine or practice is religious and thus deserving of protection under the 
First Amendment.28 On the other hand, civil courts cannot get into the 
substance of religious issues, questioning or determining the truth or 
validity of beliefs.29 
The reason our constitution forbids civil courts from getting involved 
in religious questions is because civil judges are not competent in religious 
matters.30 Moreover, if civil courts started asking these sorts of questions, 
they would inevitably end up privileging one religious interpretation over 
another.31 
Given this existing constitutional framework, and the fact that the 
Supreme Court articulated this principle, very early on, it’s a bit suspicious 
that now that we’re seeing laws that are trying to solve the problem of 
judges considering religious substantive law.  That problem has already 
been taken care of—it’s already addressed by the Constitution. 
Turning back to the Oklahoma anti-sharia law—how does it fare under 
this constitutional framework? 
Awad’s lawsuit had an Establishment Clause claim.32 He said the 
Oklahoma Ballot Initiative provided that Oklahoma courts shall not 
consider international law or sharia law, and that the courts may not look to 
                                                                                                     
 26. See id. 
 27. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 
393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (explaining that the First Amendment forbids civil courts from 
interpreting particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the 
religion). 
 28. See Jared A. Goldstein, Is There A “Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial 
Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 538 (2005) 
(“[C]ourts routinely undertake excessive fact-finding into the content of religious doctrines 
and practices in determining whether a practice or doctrine is ‘religious.’”). 
 29. See id. at 539 (explaining that courts can competently assess the content of 
religious doctrines and practices without assessing their validity). 
 30. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871) (“It is not to be supposed that the 
judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of 
all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own.”). 
 31. See Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450 (explaining that the First Amendment 
forbids civil courts from determining the importance of particular church doctrines).  
 32. Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2010), aff’d, 670 F.3d 
1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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the laws of other states if those laws include sharia law.33 It described sharia 
law in definite religious terms as Islamic law based on the Quran and the 
teaching of Muhammad.34 Thus, sharia law is the only particular body of 
law specifically proscribed by this amendment. Awad argued that the 
Oklahoma Ballot Initiative labeled him a political and social outsider 
because of his Islamic practice and belief, characterized his Islamic 
religious beliefs as a threat from which Oklahoma must be saved, and 
conveyed the unmistakable message that his Muslim faith is officially 
disfavored by the state generally, and the judicial system in particular.35 
In his Free Exercise claim, he argued that Muslims, out of all the other 
religious groups in the state, were singled out for special disfavor.36 Unlike 
any other religious groups, they were the only ones who had to scrub all 
religious terms from their legal documents. Specifically, he argued that the 
proposal might even interfere with the operation of his last will and 
testament.37 Because his will refers to and incorporates his Islamic religious 
beliefs, the Amendment would render those will provisions 
unenforceable.38 The presence of the Amendment created a cloud of 
uncertainty over the will’s full enforceability because of its religious 
references. 
In addition to Awad’s claims, there are a number of other 
hypotheticals that I can pose for you that demonstrate some of the 
problematic results of laws like this.39 
For instance, consider a situation—an employment contract—where an 
employer agrees to allow an employee to go on the Hajj pilgrimage or to 
come in on different timings during Ramadan (Ramadan is the month 
during which Muslims fast from dawn to dusk).  Maybe an employer has 
agreed in the contract that you can come in at different times, maybe after 
you break the fast, so on. Again, in order to enforce this contract, a court 
                                                                                                     
 33. Id. at 1303. 
 34. Complaint Seeking a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 
5, Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.D. Okla 2010) (No. CIV-10-1186-M). 
 35. Complaint Seeking a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, 
supra note 34, at 6. 
 36. Awad, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 1303. 
 37. Id. at 1304. 
 38. Id. 
 39. These examples were discussed in the speaker’s previously-published article, 
Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia Initiatives, 10 
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363, 404–05 (2012). 
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doesn’t have to get into the nitty gritty of Islamic law, but it does have to 
understand whether there was a meeting of the minds—what was the issue 
that they agreed to? That requires some basic reference to the sharia 
principles at issue. 
Another type of contract might involve somebody’s promise to pay for 
your Hajj pilgrimage, or to cover the expense of some other religious 
obligation. Again, the court does not need to get into the substantive issues, 
but does have to have a basic idea of what exactly Hajj pilgrimage is, which 
requires some basic understanding and fact-finding related to sharia issues. 
Not only does the Oklahoma anti-sharia law prohibit this sort of fact-
finding, but it also creates a question of discrimination. Because a similar 
contract involving either non-religious obligations or religious obligations 
of people of other faiths could easily be enforced. 
Similarly, such a law would limit a judge’s ability to craft equitable 
remedies. When courts formulate remedies or sentences, a judge often has 
flexibility and the ability to look at both public and private needs. In the 
case of a Muslim, the judge wouldn’t be able to do this because some of 
those private needs might in fact include their religious obligations. Basic 
reference to sharia principles is, by the terms of anti-sharia laws, 
completely forbidden. For instance, if you’re trying to determine 
community service hours or a visitation order in the context of a custody 
dispute, if a Muslim needs to explain her schedule or time table in terms of 
her religious obligations, the judge wouldn’t be able to consider those sorts 
of factors. 
And finally, such a law would provide unequal protection for persons 
who make use of Islamic arbitration. Now the law itself does not prevent 
the use of Islamic arbitration, people can still engage in it, and some 
Muslims in the U.S. do engage in it for the purposes of resolving family 
disagreements, inheritance or business disputes, marriage and divorce 
issues. While nothing in the law prevents the use of arbitration, once a 
person does engage in it, not only does it impact the enforceability of the 
arbitration decision, but it also takes away the protection of civil courts. A 
civil court is the only court that can enforce an arbitration decision.40 And 
before a civil court enforces it, it has to review the decision for both 
substantive and procedural fairness. Civil court review provides certain 
checks and balances to make sure that the decision isn’t, for instance, 
                                                                                                     
 40. See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2012) (stating that parties to an arbitral award may apply to a 
court to “confirm” the award as against any other party to the arbitration). 
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grossly unfair.41 Those sorts of protections are denied to Muslims who 
might want to engage in arbitration, simply because judges can’t look to 
sharia. 
So, what I propose is that instead of enacting laws that solve a problem 
that doesn’t exist, we let the American legal system do what it always has 
done, because it’s actually always worked very well. When dealing with 
contracts written with sharia principles in mind, civil courts have always 
only referred to sharia as a tangential issue, instead focusing on issues 
within their competence such as the basic principles of contract law. The 
crucial feature of any kind of arbitration is that an arbitrator, whether 
religious or not, has no ability to enforce the arbitral decision. Only state or 
federal courts have that power. In deciding whether to enforce arbitral 
awards, civil courts first review whether the parties agreed to take part in 
the arbitration of their own free will. Courts also review the decision to 
ensure the arbitrators are neutral, and that the resulting decisions are neither 
grossly unfair nor undermine public policy.  
As I mentioned earlier, these checks and balances and very carefully 
crafted safeguards protect against all of the scary things that proponents of 
anti-sharia laws claim sharia imposes. Here are a couple of examples of 
cases where sharia has come up. In one case, a federal district court 
honored the contractual choice of law provision at issue, which designated 
Saudi law.42 The court accepted that it is apparent that Islam permeates 
every aspect of life in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, including its legal 
structure. Saudi law limits damages for breach of contract to losses that are 
actual and direct, such as physical harm to property or out-of-pocket losses. 
This is based on an Islamic law principle that damages can be obtained for 
only those losses that are certain. Despite its foundations on Islamic 
principle, the Saudi law is enforceable without reference to religious 
doctrine. As such, the court applied Saudi law because doing so did not 
entangle the court in religious questions.  
Similarly, there are a number of cases that involved an agreement for 
the mahr.43 The mahr is a dowry that is paid by the husband to the wife, and 
                                                                                                     
 41. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) (allowing federal district courts to vacate arbitral awards 
upon finding “any misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced”). 
 42. See Nat’l Grp. for Commc’ns and Computers, Ltd. v. Lucent Tech.s Int’l, Inc., 331 
F. Supp. 2d 290, 293 (2004) (upholding contract provision stipulating that “interpretation 
and execution” of the contract and “claims arising therefrom” were subject to the regulations 
in force in Saudi Arabia). 
 43. See ACLU, NOTHING TO FEAR: DEBUNKING THE MYTHICAL “SHARIA THREAT” TO 
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it becomes due and payable in the instance of divorce if it hasn’t been paid 
at some point earlier. In dealing with this question, courts have approached 
it from the framework of the legal safeguards that are in place. The results 
have been different, however. For instance, in Odatalla v. Odatalla,44 a case 
in the Superior Court of New Jersey, a mahr agreement was upheld.45 The 
court determined that enforcing the sharia-based agreement raised no First 
Amendment concerns because this action was based on neutral legal 
principles of contract law.46 In contrast, the court did not uphold a mahr 
agreement in another case, Zawahiri v. Alwattar47 because it concluded that 
the husband had entered into the agreement as a result of overreaching or 
coercion.48 The court held that because the contract was signed under 
duress, it was not valid.49 
In conclusion, what I hope I demonstrated in my talk today is that, 
while anti-sharia laws purport to solve a problem that does not actually 
exist, they in turn raise new issues. Instead of creating these unnecessary 
hurdles, proponents of anti-sharia laws should instead have more faith in 
the American legal system and our constitutional framework. 
Thank you. 
  
                                                                                                     
OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM 3 (2011), available at https://www.aclu.org/religion-belief/nothing-
fear-debunking-mythical-sharia-threat-our-judicial-system (describing cases in which courts 
applied contract law to disputes involving mahr agreements). 
 44. See Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 95–96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002) 
(holding that the First Amendment did not prevent the court from enforcing a mahr 
agreement). 
 45. See id. at 98 (finding that a mahr agreement was “nothing more and nothing less” 
than a contract between two consenting adults). 
 46. See id. at 95–96 (applying principles of contract law to the mahr agreement and 
asserting that no “doctrinal issues” of religious belief or policy were involved). 
 47. See Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at 6 (Ohio Ct. App. 
July 10, 2008) (holding that husband’s agreement to pay $25,000 if parties divorced was 
coerced and thus unenforceable). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
